Any paid political advertisement... broadcast on any electronic media shall be clearly identified or marked as a paid advertisement. It shall be unlawful for any person, candidate, principal campaign committee or other political committee to broadcast ... [any] political advertisement, without a notice.., broadcast at the beginning or end of a radio or television spot, stating that the communication was a paid advertisement and giving the identification of the person, principal campaign committee or other political committee that paid for, or otherwise authorized such communication.
See also Wash Rev Code Ann § 42.17.510(1) (West 1991 & Supp 1996) ("All radio and television political advertising, whether relating to candidates or ballot propositions, shall include the sponsor's name."). Congress has outlawed anonymous communications in campaigns for federal office:
Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, or solicits any contribution through any broadcasting station... such communication-(1) if paid for and authorized by a candidate, an authorized political committee of a candidate, or its agents, shall clearly state that the communication has been paid for by such authorized political committee. nents argue that by removing the cloak of anonymity, disclosure statutes foster accountability, deter false or libelous statements, and provide voters with information helpful in evaluating an advertisement's content. 3 Yet the constitutionality of these statutes has been cast into doubt. The Supreme Court, in McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 4 invalidated a broad provision of the Ohio Elections Code that banned all anonymous political leafletting s Margaret McIntyre had challenged her one-hundred-dollar fine for distributing unsigned flyers opposing a proposed local school tax. 6 Finding that Ohio's interests did not justify the disclosure statute's burden on "core political speech," and noting the "honorable tradition" of anonymous political speech in American history, the Court held that the statute violated the First Amendment. ' McIntyre threatens to cut a broad swath through state election codes. The ruling "cast[s] doubt on the election laws of nearly every state" and "appears likely to prompt a new round of challenges to the disclosure requirements contained in No person shall write... a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is designed to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in any election... unless there appears on such form of publication in a conspicuous place ... the name and residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor.
6 See McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1514. 7 Id at 1524 . ' Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Unsigned Political Fliers, NY Times A20, A20 (Apr 20, 1995) . Prior to the Court's ruling, a broad coalition of state and local governments warned that invalidation of Ohio's statute would threaten existing state election codes. " [T] he invalidation of Ohio's source identification requirement could not only jeopardize source identification laws in many other States, but could also call into question other election disclosure laws which limit anonymity in campaign contributions, expenditures, and communications." Brief of the Council of State Governments, et al, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S Ct 1511 (1995 . The coalition characterized Ohio's law as a garden-variety campaign disclosure requirement. Id at 25. unresolved questions-reflected in the confusion of those who administer (and those who are subject to) the laws-indicate that lower courts will face considerable uncertainty in applying McIntyre to their own state disclosure statutes. 5 This Comment addresses the decision's applicability to an important and ubiquitous provision of state election codesdisclosure requirements for televised political advertisements. The Comment advocates a narrow interpretation of McIntyre and argues that laws prohibiting anonymous campaign commercials are not unconstitutional. Section I examines the tension between First Amendment goals and a state's interest in regulating its elections, paying particular attention to judicial attempts to reconcile the two when reviewing disclosure statutes. Section II discusses and critiques McIntyre and identifies the ambiguities it leaves for lower courts. Finally, Section III applies McIntyre to the context of televised speech by political candidates and argues that this type of speech differs in constitutionally significant ways from the speech protected by McIntyre. The Comment concludes that state disclosure laws, narrowly tailored to include only candidates or their agents communicating via broadcast media, remain constitutional after McIntyre.
I. REGULATING ELECTION-RELATED SPEECH
Election-related speech restrictions pose tough questions because they implicate conflicting interests. On one side stands the First Amendment, which has its "fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." 6 Courts have consistently recognized the First
1995).
" Two courts have applied McIntyre to disclosure statutes and reached opposite conclusions. Yet the difference in scope of the contested statutes-one was limited to fund raising and the other swept in all anonymous advertisements relating to elections and ballot initiatives-precludes confident prediction about post-McIntyre jurisprudence. The Second Circuit, in FEC v Survival Education Fund, Inc., 65 F3d 285, 295-98 (2d Cir 1995) , upheld a federal law requiring disclosure by groups that solicit contributions even if the solicitation includes speech about political candidates. The court found that the state's interest in preventing a contributor from mistakenly donating to a cause he does not support is sufficient to overcome a First Amendment challenge. Id at 1076 (1985) (suggesting that regulation of the political process "might be a context warranting distrust of elected officials," raising the "systematic possibility that legislators will behave in self-rather than public-interested ways").
" Just as a State may take steps to ensure that its governing political institutions and officials properly discharge public responsibilities and maintain public trust and confidence, a State has a legitimate interest in upholding the integrity of the electoral process itself. But when a State seeks to uphold that interest by restricting speech, the limitations on state authority imposed by the First Amendment are manifestly implicated. 
A. Talley: The Value of Anonymous Speech
The seminal case reviewing restrictions on anonymous speech is Talley v California, in which the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a Los Angeles city ordinance that required handbills to bear the name and address of the person who prepared, distributed, or sponsored them.' The plaintiff in Talley distributed leaflets urging a boycott of certain local merchants. 24 Although the handbills were attributed to "National Consumers Mobilization," with an address provided, the plaintiff was charged with violating the ordinance because the leaflets did not bear the plaintiff's personal name or address. 2 The city ordinance invalidated in Talley was distinguishable in that the federal disclosure requirements at issue in Buckley were more narrowly tailored: they represented the "least restrictive means" for achieving the government's interests. 3 3
The Buckley Court concluded that slight infringements on the First Amendment rights of certain speakers, although deterring some potential speakers from speaking at all, nonetheless served larger First Amendment goals by providing voters with relevant information about a candidate. 3 4 In this sense, the Court's intent was not to maximize the amount of speech that enters the public arena. Instead, the Court accepted a slight 2 USC § 434(b)(2). The statute also required private individuals to disclose independent expenditures made for communications advocating the election or defeat of candidates for federal office. Disclosure of contributors' identities (and the amount of their contributions) helps voters evaluate candidates and predict their future performance in office. Specifically, disclosure of contributors reveals a candidate's ideological leanings. Politicians recognize that accepting a contribution from the NRA or a gay rights group, for example, signals to the electorate that the candidate generally supports (or at least does not oppose) the group's goals. See id at 66-68. For a general discussion of the influence of money on political campaigns, see Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money, Elections, and Political Reform (Cong Q 4th ed 1992) .
Buckley, 424 US at 68. Disclosure statutes are "a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to public view." Id at 82. This line of logic was echoed in First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, where the Court emphasized the informational interest that disclosure statutes served by assisting voters in evaluating the arguments placed before them, noting that "[ildentification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected." 435 US 765, 792 n 32 (1978) . Despite these remarks, the precedential value of Bellotti in the disclosure-statute context is quite limited, since the constitutionality of such a statute was not before the Court. See McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1522. This unpleasant reality, however, has not deterred attorneys' talismanic invocations of the decision. See, for example, Brief of Amici Curiae for the States of Tennessee, et al, in Support of Respondent at 5-6 (cited in note 2) (using Bellotti to support state's interest in helping voters evaluate political arguments through disclosure requirements).
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Disclosure Statutes after McIntyre 1219 reduction in the total quantity of speech in exchange for a higher quality. truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ... .""0 In this sense, the fact that a communication is anonymous is merely one of many factors to be considered when evaluating the statement's truth. Accordingly, voters are free to attach whatever significance they wish to anonymity. Some courts seize the opportunity to praise the sophistication of the electorate: 'coters are not sheep, and it is implausible to suppose that they will ignore the circumstance of anonymity in evaluating the message." 4 '
These courts have not denied a state's interest in informing voters. Rather, they have suggested that this informational interest is not strong enough to justify restrictions on political speech. The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, downplayed the state's informational interest and invalidated the state's disclosure statute, noting that "tlhe State's fear that voters might make an illadvised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech." 4 2 Alternatively, some courts do not deprecate the state's informational interest, but instead indicate that a disclosure statute is a poor means of furthering it. 4 " Under this view, the additional information such a statute provides is marginal at best. Finally, nearly every court that has invalidated a state disclosure statute has invoked Talley in emphasizing the benefits of anonymous political speech."
In is an attempt to raise the ethical standards of political discussion, to promote fair play and fair competition in politics, to banish cowards from the political arena, and extirpate the dirty business of surreptitious character assassination."" The approaches taken by pre-McIntyre courts generally reflect attempts to balance a state's informational interest, and its interest in regulating its elections, against speakers' First Amendment rights. Although the cases typically begin by examining the concrete statutory language at issue, the holdings are premised on more ethereal considerations-namely, the costs and benefits of requiring disclosure. Quantifying these costs and benefits is a tough task premised on hazy empirical judgments. Will forced disclosure chill valuable political speech? How helpful to a voter is a speaker's identity? And won't disclosure only chill relatively worthless speech, such as personal attacks on an oppo- 
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The University of Chicago Law Review nent? The courts' answers to these questions are factored into the balance and determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. What ostensibly begins as a close analysis of statutory language dissolves into a pragmatic inquiry, resulting in a predictably wide range of conclusions among the courts. The pre-McIntyre courts' differing treatment of disclosure statutes resulted in part from the vast, uncharted middle ground between Talley and Buckley. Somewhere between the sweeping Los Angeles ordinance and the minimally restrictive federal statute lay the line between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible.
II. MCINTYRE: A RECIPE FOR UNCERTAINTY
McIntyre presented the Court with an opportunity to smooth out the inconsistencies resulting from the lower courts' hesitant attempts to reconcile Talley and Buckley. But although the Court spoke decisively in striking down Ohio's disclosure statute, it failed to articulate its reasoning clearly. 49 As a result, the lower courts will continue to face uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of election-related restraints on speech. The dividing line between constitutional and unconstitutional remains hazy.
A. McIntyre
Margaret McIntyre was fined one hundred dollars for violating § 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Code by distributing anonymous handbills protesting a proposed school tax levy. 5 " She challenged the statute, which prohibited the distribution of political literature that omitted the name and address of the issuing individual or campaign official, 5 ' on First Amendment grounds. 
Id at 1535 (Scalia dissenting).
' Some of the handbills she distributed identified her as the author. Others were attributed only to "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS." The Ohio Elections Commission did not allege that her handbills were in any way libelous or misleading. The United States Supreme Court disagreed. In a majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court found that the Ohio court had employed too lenient a standard of review. 5 Although laws that merely "control the mechanics of the election process" are properly reviewable under a relatively permissive balancing test, the same does not apply to laws that constitute a "regulation of pure speech." 5 6 Thus, the Court held, "[wihen a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest." Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 789 (1983) . In that case, the Court reviewed another election regulation challenged on First Amendment grounds. John Anderson, an independent presidential candidate, alleged that Ohio's early filing deadline for presidential candidates placed an unconstitutional burden on his and his supporters' voting and associational rights. Id at 782. The Court invalidated the regulation and established a balancing test for reviewing constitutional challenges to state election laws. Under this test, a court must first determine the character and magnitude of the injury to the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The court must then weigh these considerations against the legitimacy and strength of the state's interests underlying the regulation. Id at 789. 57 McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1519. One intriguing aspect of the Court's decision is its failure to challenge seriously the premise that Ohio's disclosure statute was a viewpointneutral restriction on speech, even though common sense suggests that challengers of popular incumbents might have a greater need for anonymity. In a footnote, the Court conceded that "[airguably, the disclosure requirement places a more significant burden on advocates of unpopular causes than on defenders of the status quo. For purposes of our analysis, however, we assume the statute evenhandedly burdens all speakers who have a legitimate interest in remaining anonymous." Id at 1518 & n 8. But see Anderson, 460 US
The University of Chicago Law Review
The Court found Ohio's two asserted interests-preventing fraud and informing the electorate-insufficient. Other sections of the Ohio Elections Code already prohibited fraudulent or libelous statements; 58 the disclosure statute was therefore supplementary at best. Moreover, the disclosure statute did not target only those anonymous statements that were fraudulent or libelous, but swept all anonymous statements into its ambit. The Court similarly dismissed Ohio's informational interest. The need to provide voters with additional relevant information, the Court reasoned, does not justify requiring a writer to make statements he would otherwise omit-particularly where, as here, the name and address of the author are probably meaningless to the recipient. 59 Yet the Court's careful language and qualified reasoning-measuring the value of the writer's name to the document's recipient6°--suggests that under different circumstances, perhaps involving a different class of writers or recipients, the Court might find a state's informational interest sufficient, and its disclosure statute constitutional.
The Court carefully wove its way through First Amendment and election law precedent, distinguishing both Talley and Buckley. Talley was easy: the ordinance at issue there prohibited anonymous handbilling in any place and under any circumstances, whereas Ohio's statute encompassed only those documents intended to influence the electoral process. 6 ' In distinguishing Buckley, however, the Court relied on the nature of the regulated speech itself. Although the federal reporting statute upheld in at 798 ("A State's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some skepticism."). Indeed, a cynic would question this facial neutrality, finding it unsurprising that so many state legislatures--composed, after all, of incumbents-have sought to "raise the level of political debate" by outlawing a type of advertising often aimed at themselves. Insofar as the interest in informing the electorate means nothing more than the provision of additional information that may either buttress or undermine the argument in a document, we think the identity of the speaker is no different from other components of the document's content that the author is free to include or exclude.
"o Id at 1520.
81 Id at 1517. The Court noted that the Ohio and Los Angeles disclosure laws shared one infirmity: neither was limited to fraudulent or libelous statements. Id.
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Buckley required disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures, that minor intrusion on First Amendment rights:
[I]s a far cry from compelled self-identification on all election-related writings. A written election-related document-particularly a leaflet-is often a personally crafted statement of a political viewpoint.... As such, identification of the author against her will is particularly intrusive; it reveals unmistakably the content of her thoughts on a controversial issue."
In distinguishing the two disclosure statutes, the Court thus recognized a higher level of protection for "personal" speech (as typified by a leaflet) than for "impersonal" speech (as typified by a campaign contribution) on the basis that the latter reveals far less about the speaker.
Finally, the Court echoed its language in Talley by highlighting the historical pedigree of anonymous speech. Permitting anonymous speech, the Court reasoned, not only benefits the individual by granting him protection from a hostile majority, but also enriches society by allowing unpopular ideas to enter the marketplace. Even if unwelcome initially, these ideas may gradually change public attitudes: 'Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent." 63 In this sense, anonymity is simply the necessary price of a healthy and unmodified public debate.
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that since the text of the Constitution was unclear on this question, "the widespread and long-accepted practices of the American people are the best indication of what fundamental beliefs it was intended to enshrine."" He pointed out that every state except California has enacted some form of disclosure statute, the first doing so in 1890.65 Furthermore, Scalia noted the dangers-and the "silli- " Id at 1534 (Scalia dissenting). In a concurrence, Justice Thomas concluded that the phrase "freedom of speech, or of the press," as originally understood, did in fact protect anonymous political leafletting. Id at 1525 (Thomas concurring).
' Id at 1533 (Scalia dissenting). See also id at 1530 ("At a time when both political branches of Government and both political parties reflect a popular desire to leave more decisionmaking authority to the States, today's decision moves in the opposite direction,
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The University of Chicago Law Review ness'--that result from a generalized right to anonymous speech. For example, he questioned whether a public-access cable channel could refuse to permit anonymous, masked performances, or whether a government periodical must abandon its policy of prohibiting anonymous letters to the editor. 6 6 But protecting anonymous communication risks more than silliness. Establishing a broad right to anonymity would eliminate one of the last remaining guarantors of civilized public debate. For those not constrained by their own conscience, public accountability serves as an excellent deterrent of outrageous or patently offensive speech-particularly during an election. 
B. Critique of McIntyre
The majority's opinion left several puzzles for lower courts seeking to determine the sweep of the holding. Three points in particular warrant emphasis. First, it is unclear precisely when a law burdens "core political speech" and when it merely "controls the mechanics of the electoral process." The distinction is crucial: laws that burden core political speech trigger the formidable "exacting scrutiny" test and must be narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest." By comparison, laws that regulate elections remain reviewable under a balancing test.
Clearly, many provisions of state election codes both regulate the electoral process and burden speech. 7 3 It will likely fall to the lower courts to draw meaningful distinctions among contested regulations in determining the proper standard of review. Although McIntyre offers little guidance as to how to classify election laws, the Court nevertheless indicated that core political speech encompasses a vast range of speech, including discussion of governmental affairs, debate over candidates' qualifications, and speech concerning public issues in general. 74 The Court's broad language suggests that in borderline cases, a disclosure statute will be reviewed with exacting scrutiny.
Second, even if speech constitutes "core political speech," under what circumstances may it be subject to state regulation? The obvious answer is that it may be regulated to secure a sufficiently compelling state interest, provided that the statute is narrowly tailored. But this just begs the question: after McIntyre, is there any state interest strong enough to withstand the withering gaze of exacting scrutiny? The Court's answer borders on 
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the cryptic. After condemning the overbreadth of the Ohio statute, the Court conceded that "a State's enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification requirement. . .. ", Yet the Court failed to elaborate on what might constitute a sufficient enforcement interest, 76 or, for that matter, a sufficiently limited identification requirement. In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg sought to limit the scope of the majority's decision. Agreeing that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional as applied to Mrs. McIntyre, Ginsburg cautioned: "We do not thereby hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances, require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity." 7 1 7 What precisely constitutes these "other, larger circumstances" remains to be answered by future courts.
Third, the decision leaves open the degree of First Amendment protection afforded core political speech in other media, such as broadcast television and radio. The actual holding is narrowly confined to written communication, and the Court explicitly declined to review the constitutionality of § 3599.09(B) of the Ohio Elections Code, which prohibits anonymous speech uttered over the broadcasting facilities of any Ohio radio or television station, since the provision was not at issue in the case. 78 Moreover, the Court implied that a state might indeed have a stronger interest in requiring disclosure for statements broadcast to the public, as opposed to statements distributed in written form. No person shall utter or cause to be uttered, over the broadcasting facilities of any radio or television station within this state, any communication which is designed to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or the adoption or defeat of any issue or to influence the voters in any election, unless the speaker identifies himself with his name and residence address or unless such communication identifies the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization responsible for the same with the name and residence or business address of such officer .... But to the extent that the value of anonymous speech lies in its potential to change majority attitudes, limiting its form to printed material-and denying it the vast audience reached by modern broadcast technology-appears a hollow protection at best. In short, it is difficult to gauge from McIntyre the importance of allowing anonymous statements to enter the marketplace when the context shifts from a print to a broadcast medium. The urgent emphasis on the social benefits of anonymous speech seems universally applicable to all media, yet the Court's carefully qualified language undercuts any firm conclusions.
Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3599.09(B) (Baldwin 1995
III. REviEWING STATE DIsCLOSURE STATUTES
A broad reading of McIntyre threatens to cut a wide swath through state election codes. Such a reading should be rejected. Indeed, the Court openly acknowledged that states may still regulate political speech, circumscribing the scope of its opinion by recognizing that "Buckley may permit a more narrowly drawn statute" and by condemning Ohio's "blunderbuss approach." Under the framework offered here, four types of political communication exist: (1) print speech by private individuals; (2) broadcast speech by private individuals; (3) print speech by candidates; and (4) broadcast speech by candidates. Anonymous speakers in the first category are clearly protected under McIntyre; this Section concludes that McIntyre should not extend to the fourth. Categories two and three, although not directly controlled by McIntyre, will likely fall within its sweep. The Court's recognition of the "honorable tradition" of anonymous leafletting (suggesting protection of anonymous print speech by candidates), coupled with its hesitation to force disclosure by "lone protestors" (suggesting protection of anonymous broadcast speech by private individuals), indicates McIntyre's applicability of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.") (emphasis added).
' Id at 1524.
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to categories two and three. Nonetheless, such a prediction is inevitably speculative and, as noted above, is hampered by the many ambiguities in the Court's opinion. 8 ' As for category four, there are very sound policy reasons for prohibiting anonymous broadcast speech by candidates. 82 But disclosure statutes must now be reviewed within the framework established by the Court, and policy must yield to the First Amendment. This Comment seeks to halt the application of McIntyre through constitutional argument, working within the Court's framework, by drawing a line between categories three and four. See text accompanying notes 98-107. Again, the prediction that McIntyre will likely apply to categories two and three is not to say that invalidating those types of disclosure statutes is necessarily a wise idea.
' See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 108 (Free Press 1993) ("Under current law, government has little power to regulate the print media, whereas the Court allows a range of restrictions on broadcasters."), citing FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726 (1978 ), Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367 (1969 ), and National Broadcasting Co. v United States, 319 US 190 (1943 . CBS, Inc. v FCC, 453 US 367, 396-97 (1981 Commentators and the Court itself have advanced several theories for this differing treatment. The most common explanation is scarcity: since there are more would-be broadcasters than available frequencies, government must allocate licenses, and therefore has a freer hand in regulating the resulting communication." 6 Another explanation rests on a "social impact" theory-that broadcast is inherently a more intrusive medium than print (since children or unsuspecting adults may inadvertently view offensive material broadcast into their homes)., 7 To be sure, the scarcity rationale is evaporating in light of the expansion of cable television, and disclosure statutes are not aimed at regulating obscene material. But the Court's precedent clearly indicates that government stands on far firmer constitutional ground when regulating broadcast speech. As the Court recently observed, "[lit is true that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers than of speakers in other media. ' See, for example, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC, 114 S Ct 2445, 2457 (1994) ("Although courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its inception, we have declined to question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast jurisprudence, and see no reason to do so here.") (footnotes and citations omitted); FCC v League of Women Voters, 468 US 364, 377 (1984) ("The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the new medium of broadcasting... is that '[b]roadcast frequencies are a scarce resource [that] must be portioned out among applicants.'"), quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v Democratic Natl Comm., 412 US 94, 101 (1973) . 87 See, for example, Pacifica, 438 US at 748 (Broadcasting has a "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans."). In addition to the scarcity and social impact rationales, a variety of other theories have been advanced to explain the differing treatments. For a general discussion of these theories, 
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The University of Chicago Law Review um function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 89 In this view, the purpose of the First Amendment is to enrich public debate and promote informed democratic deliberation." Often the selfgovernance conception collides with the First Amendment's goal of protecting self-expression. As one commentator summarized the conflict:
[F]irst amendment protection of speech has a dual function: it serves not only to ensure that each individual is free to speak out, but also to enhance the likelihood that the public can hear all facets of everything that is pertinent to the decisions it must make. The public's first amendment rights as hearers are just as important as their rights as speak-
The distinction between citizens' rights as speakers and their rights as listeners is helpful in considering the purpose of disclosure statutes. A disclosure statute is essentially a "precommitment strategy" 2 -a means by which citizens, acting through their state legislatures, can determine in advance the process for choosing their elected officials. In this sense, a disclosure statute represents the electorate's considered finding that it does not want to be influenced by anonymous advertisements in reaching a voting decision. Empirical research suggests that this may be a wise choice: studies have shown that if a television advertisement can be made to seem neutral or authoritative, viewers will later think they got the information from watching the news. 9 " Disclo- 367, 389-90, 396 (1969) Restricting political speech to further self-governance is often controversial: a common counterargument is that the restrictions muzzle self-expression. 9 4 By prohibiting anonymous speech, disclosure statutes are guilty as charged. But the counterargument seems less persuasive when applied to candidates who broadcast campaign commercials. This is because during an election, the interest in self-governance is arguably at its peak. As the Court observed in Burdick v Takushi, a case in which it upheld a state's prohibition of write-in voting, " [a] ttributing to elections a more generalized expressive function would undermine the ability of states to operate elections fairly and efficiently."" Permitting a candidate to broadcast anonymous speech risks precisely this. Particularly in the context of an election, self-governance should not be sacrificed to candidate self-expression.
US
Finally, disclosure statutes confined to broadcast communication reduce the risk of selective enforcement. The Court has long recognized the danger of government officials singling out antigovernment speech. 96 Speech criticizing incumbent officials typically reaches its peak during election seasons, when thousands upon thousands of political messages-including campaign brochures, fliers, and broadcast advertisements-reach the public. Clearly, not all of this material can be monitored for conformity to disclosure laws, nor (given limited state resources) can every violation be prosecuted. Accordingly, when partisan political officials serving on state election boards are tasked with monitoring partisan political advertisements, there arises a very real risk of selective enforcement. Vindictive and opportunistic politicians may pressure the election board into punishing their oppo- 
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The University of Chicago Law Review nents---one need look no further than the facts of McIntyre to recognize this risk." Confining disclosure statutes to broadcast communication reduces this risk for two main reasons. First, there are simply far fewer candidate commercials on television and radio than there are fliers and leaflets distributed on street corners or mailed to voters. Second, the distribution points of broadcast communications are centralized: in any state, there exist but a limited number of television and radio stations that air political commercials. In short, it is far easier to monitor the activities of a limited number of broadcast stations than to police every street corner and shopping mall in America. Limiting the regulatory field increases the visibility of any particular regulatory act or omission. The risk of selective enforcement does not evaporate, but clearly diminishes, when disclosure statutes are limited to broadcast communications.
Under the McIntyre framework, any restriction on core political speech must be reviewed with exacting scrutiny. So although a disclosure statute limited to broadcast communication is more constitutionally permissible than one that encompasses print, the statute still needs to rest on something more substantial than a history of regulation. That is the concern of the next Section.
B. Candidate Speech Is Distinguishable from Other Political Speech
The overly broad Ohio statute invalidated in McIntyre regulated political speech by all citizens. One way to narrow a disclosure statute is to restrict only the speech of candidates for elective office. 98 Disclosure statutes that require candidates to identify themselves as the source of a political advertisement serve stronger state informational interests than the Ohio statute struck down in McIntyre. The Court rejected Ohio's claim that the name of an unknown protester on a leaflet would materially enhance a voter's ability to evaluate the message therein. 9 9 This is eminently plausible: the name of a private citizen shrouded in obscurity serves little, if any, informational interest. But where the speaker is a candidate, his name is far more recognizable to the general public. Accordingly, the voter's ability to discount for bias and general credibility is materially enhanced by learning the source. This increased informational interest-furthering a voter's evaluation of the speaker's message-represents a fundamental difference between a state's interest in a disclosure statute limited to candidates and the (insufficient) interest alleged by Ohio.
Candidate disclosure fulfills another informational interest: it facilitates evaluation of the speaker himself. This interest is virtually meaningless where the speaker is a private citizen. But if a candidate is speaking, the state's interest in facilitating public evaluation of the speaker assumes heightened importance." Consider the difference between political speech by a candidate urging a vote against his opponent and political speech by a private citizen urging a vote against a ballot initiative. Both speakers are, in a sense, "biased," and their identities are often important components of evaluating their respective messages. But only when the candidate is speaking does the listener have an interest in evaluating the speaker. Whereas a ballot question, or a debate over a pending bill, is a choice among incorporeal public policies, a candidate election is a different animal entirely: it is a choice between specific individuals, or more precisely, between ' "[In the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and address of the author adds little, if anything, to the reader's ability to evaluate the document's message." McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1520.
" The Court has recognized that enhancing the public's knowledge about candidates for elective office is a valid public interest. See Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 796 (1983) (Mnere can be no question about the legitimacy of the State's interest in fostering informed and educated expressions of the popular will in a general election.").
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